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Exchange Rates and Profit Margins: 
The Case of Japanese Exporters
Thomas Klitgaard
xporters must make a pricing decision when-
ever exchange rates change. A rise in the yen’s
value, for example, forces Japanese exporting
firms to decide how much to alter the prices
seen by their foreign customers. At one extreme, they
could lower the yen price of their exports so that the dollar
price of their sales to the United States would remain unaf-
fected. The yen’s rise would then have no impact on the
price and volume of U.S. imports from Japan, but it would
have adverse consequences for Japanese profit margins. At
the other extreme, Japanese firms could keep the yen price
of their exports unchanged so that the yen’s rise would be
completely passed through to U.S. consumers in the form of
higher prices in dollar terms. The profit margins of Japanese
exporters would then remain unchanged, but the volume
of sales would drop, leading to a lower level of profits.
This article examines how Japanese exporters are
responding to the conflicting objectives of maintaining
stable profit margins and stable export sales when the value
of the yen fluctuates. We find that Japanese firms tend to
strike a balance between these goals. The firms’ foreign
customers do see exchange-rate-driven changes in prices,
but the firms moderate the extent of these changes by
altering their profit margins. For Japanese exporters pro-
ducing industrial machinery, electrical machinery, and
transportation equipment, our analysis suggests that a
10 percent rise in the yen leads to a roughly 4 percent
decline in export margins (relative to the margins on goods
sold in Japan) when other factors are held constant. That
is, exporters in these industries pass on more than half of
any change in the yen to the price seen by their foreign
customers and absorb the remainder by adjusting profit
margins on their foreign sales.
We also address other key issues related to the
behavior of profit margins. For example, the short-run
response of profit margins to exchange rate movements
appears to be most pronounced in the transportation equip-
ment and electrical machinery industries. One explanation
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for this is that these two industries have a greater tendency
to invoice their goods in foreign currency terms so that
prices, when measured in yen terms, respond automat-
ically to exchange rate swings. In addition, the direc-
tion of the yen’s movement is found to have no effect on
how willing Japanese exporters are to use profit margins
to stabilize prices in foreign markets. Firms are just as
likely to raise profit margins when the yen depreciates
as they are to cut margins when the yen appreciates.
Finally, an examination of profit margins since the
beginning of the Asian currency crisis in mid-1997
reveals that only firms in the electrical machinery indus-
try have altered their pricing behavior. The higher than
expected profit margins on exports from this industry,
however, do not appear to be related to how these firms
are responding to yen movements.
EXCHANGE RATES AND EXPORT PRICES
The consequences for the U.S. economy from a change
in the yen’s value depend on how much of any change is
passed through by Japanese exporters to the prices seen
by their U.S. customers.1 Chart 1 shows that by 1995,
prices of imports from Japan were up roughly 20 per-
cent from 1991, the first year for which data are avail-
able. But if Japanese export prices had remained
unchanged in yen terms (meaning a full pass-through of
changes in the yen), then U.S. import prices of Japanese
goods would have tracked the dollar/yen index. The
U.S. import price of Japanese goods did not rise by
nearly as much as the dollar/yen exchange rate in the
first half of the 1990s because Japanese firms lowered
their export prices in yen terms. When the yen started
to depreciate in early 1995, the price of U.S. imports
from Japan did not fall as much as the currency rate did
because Japanese firms took this opportunity to lift
their yen export prices back up.
There are two possible explanations for how
Japanese firms are able to offset yen movements. One is
that the yen has a significant impact on production
costs. For example, a stronger yen lowers the cost of
imported inputs. The drop in production costs, in yen
terms, then makes it easier for firms to lower yen export
prices (Box A). The second explanation is that Japanese
exporters absorb part of the yen’s movement into their
profit margins, an action that reduces the profit on
each item sold when the yen appreciates and raises the
profit margin when the yen depreciates. It is this latter
explanation that will now be explored.
THE YEN’S IMPACT ON PROFIT MARGINS
Studies that focus on profit margins are derived from the
belief that firms, having found a profit-maximizing price
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in each market based on supply and demand conditions,
will attempt to keep their goods close to this price. This
idea of pricing to market means that firms are inclined to
absorb currency swings into their profit margins in order
to stabilize prices seen by foreign customers.2
Data on profit margins of exports and domestic
sales are not available separately, but we can construct a
good proxy variable since Japanese wholesale price data
contain two separate price indexes. One is for prices
charged by Japanese firms to their foreign customers and
the other is for prices charged to their domestic customers.
Changes in the ratio of the two indexes can be inter-
preted as measuring changes in firms’ relative profit
margins.3 That is, if export prices are falling relative to
prices charged to domestic customers, then the markup
over costs for exports has fallen relative to the markup
for domestic sales, assuming the same production costs
for both sets of goods.
A comparison of export prices and domestic prices
reveals that profit margins on exports relative to domestic
sales varied substantially over the 1990s. Table 1 shows
that the prices Japanese firms charged domestic customers
in Japan’s four major exporting industries were stable from
1990 to 1995,4 with the exception of those for electrical
machinery, which declined 13 percent (in line with the
deflationary trend of prices in this industry). During the
The yen affects the price of imported goods used by Japanese
exporters. When the yen appreciates, the yen price of
imports such as oil and other commodities, which are typi-
cally contracted in dollar terms, drops. During the yen’s rise
from 1990 to 1995, for example, import prices fell 25 per-
cent, suggesting that exporters were significantly aided in
their efforts to reduce the yen price of their goods during this
period through lower production costs. 
The data, though, suggest that any help for Japanese
exporters trying to stabilize the foreign currency price of their
goods is limited. For example, from 1990 to 1995, the raw
material price of fuel in the Japanese wholesale price index fell
25 percent, in line with the overall import price index. Over the
same period, the intermediate price of energy—the price seen by
manufacturers—fell by a more modest 7 percent. Indeed, prices
for all inputs (both imports and domestically produced goods)
declined by roughly 5 percent for the industrial machinery,
transportation equipment, and precision equipment industries
during the yen’s sharp rise in first half of the decade (see table).
Input prices of electrical machinery fell more sharply, by 13 per-
cent, but this was due in part to the strong deflationary trend in
this industry.
The modest change in input costs for manufacturers,
relative to the size of the yen’s movements, was also evident
when the yen depreciated from 1995 to 1998. Import
prices rose 18 percent, and the wholesale price of raw
material fuel jumped 15 percent. Nevertheless, the inter-
mediate price of energy was up 2 percent and the index of
input prices for Japan’s four major exporting industries
fell in the range of 0 to 4 percent. 
In general, input prices seen by Japanese firms are
much more stable than exchange rates, a factor that limits
how much exchange-rate-induced swings in production costs
can help Japanese exporters offset currency movements. The
more modest the impact the yen has on production costs, the
more the efforts to offset the yen’s impact on the foreign
currency price of Japanese exports must be accomplished
by varying profit margins. 
BOX A: THE YEN’S IMPACT ON INPUT COSTS
PERCENTAGE CHANGE IN INPUT PRICES
Industry 1990-95 1995-98
Industrial machinery -3.5 -0.3
Electrical machinery -12.0 -3.9
Transportation equipment -3.7 -1.6
Precision equipment -5.7 -1.6
Source: Bank of Japan.  
Notes: Percentage changes are not annualized. Data for 1998 are through 
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same period, export prices dropped 7 to 10 percent for all
industries except electrical machinery, which fell 35 percent.
As a consequence, there were substantial differences in
the markup between domestic and foreign sales in 1995
compared with markup differences in 1990. 
Divergences also occurred when the yen started
falling in 1995. From 1995 to 1998, domestic prices con-
tinued on the same path, with prices being stable except
for electrical machinery prices, which fell 15 percent. But
the behavior of export prices was very different. Prices for
industrial machinery were up 11 percent and those for
transportation equipment were up 23 percent. Even elec-
trical machinery, with its strong deflationary trend, saw
prices rise 3 percent during this period. 
These data show that Japanese firms charge
different prices for their Japanese and foreign customers
when the yen changes value. Firms try to stabilize prices
as seen by their customers in both foreign and domestic
markets, which means that their relative profit margins
rise and fall with the yen. The next section explains why
a profit-maximizing strategy leads firms to vary mark-
ups across markets. 
PROFIT MAXIMIZING WITH EXCHANGE 
RATE CHANGES
A useful model for understanding why profit margins vary
between domestic and foreign markets was developed by
Marston (1990). Firms in this model are assumed to have
some control over their prices because of product differen-
tiation or some other market imperfection. Manufacturers
produce goods locally but sell them in both domestic and
export markets. These firms charge   (in yen terms) in
the domestic market and   (in foreign currency terms) in
export markets. We assume that imperfect arbitrage
between markets allows prices to differ in each market.
Therefore, firms can take advantage of the profit-maximizing
strategy of setting prices according to each market’s
demand characteristics. 
To illustrate, we think of prices as markups over
the same marginal costs: 
(1)        and
            .
The exchange rate, S, is foreign currency per yen, P is the
general price level, and Y is income. The asterisk represents
foreign variables. The destination-specific markup functions
M and N depend on price elasticities of demand in each
Ph
Px
Ph MP h PY , ¤ () MC =
Px S ¤ NP x P* Y* , ¤ () MC =
market and how these elasticities change with prices.5 A
number of factors—such as consumer tastes, the substi-
tutability with competing products, and the firm’s market
share—dictate these demand characteristics. Any gap
between   and   reflects differences between the
markup functions M and N. 
Essentially, the model says that with common
production costs, differences in prices for any particular
market are based on marginal revenue calculations made by
the firm, which in turn are dictated by the responsiveness
of demand to changes in prices. Any negative relationship
between demand and prices implies a negative relationship
between prices and markups.6 An exchange rate movement
alters profit margins on exports because firms know that
Ph Px S ¤
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Industrial machinery -6.7 -1.1 10.6 0.0
Electrical machinery -35.0 -12.7 2.6 -14.9
Transportation
  equipment -8.9 -1.9 23.3 -1.7
Precision equipment -9.8 -1.3 13.0 -0.9
Source: Bank of Japan.
Notes: Percentage changes are not annualized. Data for 1998 are through October.
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letting prices automatically rise when their currency falls
reduces the demand for their goods. As a result, export
prices, in foreign currency terms, do not adjust one-to-one
with exchange rate changes.
Production costs and income also affect relative
profit margins when consumer demand characteristics
differ across markets. For example, an increase in input
costs such as energy would push a firm to raise prices in
both markets, but not necessarily by the same amount.
The relative change in the two prices depends on  how
customers in the two markets react to higher prices. The
impact of income on profit margins is determined by dif-
ferences in demand elasticities with respect to prices and to
income. The dependence on differences in demand
characteristics across markets means that the model does
not require any particular direction for relative margins to
move with changes in production costs or income. 
In sum, Marston’s model suggests that the yen
and a set of other variables influence the relative markup
measured by the ratio of the export price index to the price
index for Japanese goods sold in Japan. We will now use
the model to evaluate empirically the impact of exchange
rate changes on these margins across Japan’s four major
exporting industries. 
THE LONG-RUN RESPONSE OF PROFIT 
MARGINS TO CHANGES IN THE YEN 




where   is the yen price of exports,   is the price of
Japanese goods sold in Japan,   is the exchange rate,   is
the overall wholesale price index,   is production costs,
and   is income. An asterisk designates a foreign variable.
All variables are in log levels. The coefficients on the real
exchange rate, real production costs, and real output measures
are dictated by the demand characteristics faced by each
industry in both foreign and domestic markets. The only
sign implied by the model is that the coefficient on the real
exchange rate,  , is negative. 
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Dynamic ordinary least squares regressions are a
statistically efficient method for estimating the long-run
response of relative export prices to each of these variables
(Box B). Table 2 shows that the real yen index has a signif-
icant impact on relative profit margins. In particular, the
estimates for   are around -0.4 for industrial machinery,
electrical machinery, and transportation equipment, three
industries that together make up 70 percent of Japanese
exports. This means that a 10 percent appreciation of the
yen, all else being kept constant, decreases yen export
prices by 4 percent relative to prices charged by Japanese
firms to their domestic customers over the long run.7 The
fourth industry, precision equipment, has profit margins
that respond much more modestly to the yen, with relative
export prices falling only 2 percent for every 10 percent
b1
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Constant 3.11 2.08 -0.06 5.93
(75.1) (9.6) (1.4) (10.4)
Real exchange rate -0.38 -0.37 -0.46 -0.21
(37.2) (11.5) (22.9) (6.9)
Japanese industrial -0.46 0.37 — -0.76
   production (23.6) (8.9) (9.3)
Foreign industrial 0.19 -0.37 0.50 —
  production (11.8) (4.9) (22.7)
Real unit labor — — — -0.29
  costs (4.1)
Real input costs — 0.84 -0.71 —
(7.7) (4.6)
Adjusted R2 .99 .99 .95 .93
Sum of squared
  errors
.01 .04 .03 .14
ADF statistic -5.5 -4.2 -5.7 -4.7
Error-correction -0.11 -0.13 -0.19 -0.10
 coefficient (2.9) (3.5) (4.4) (3.6)
Source:  Author’s calculations.
Notes: The sample period extends from January 1981 to June 1997. Variables are 
in log-level form. The regressions follow the dynamic ordinary least squares 
method as described in the article. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
Newey-West adjusted standard errors.
     The Campbell and Perron method is used to select lags for the ADF statistic: 
The regression is initially run with twelve lags; if the twelfth lag is insignificant, 
then the lag is deleted and the regression is run again. This process is repeated 
until the last lag is significant at the 5 percent level. The critical values for the 
ADF depend on the number of variables in the regression and the sample size. For 
all regressions but electrical machinery, the critical values are -3.8 (5 percent) and 
-4.4 (1 percent). Because the electrical machinery regression has one more vari-
able, the critical values are -4.2 (5 percent) and -4.7 (1 percent). The data are 
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rise in the yen. Apparently, this industry has foreign
customers that are relatively insensitive to price changes. 
The model discussed above makes no restrictions
on the sign or the magnitude of the other coefficients since
these estimates reflect reduced-form representations of
differences in demand characteristics between markets.
Of note is the fact that the electrical machinery regres-
sion calculates a sign on its foreign industrial production,
domestic income, and input costs that is the opposite of the
signs estimated for the other industries. 
With these results, it is now possible to address
issues about how Japanese profit margins respond in the
Japanese pricing-to-market behavior is estimated in two
stages. The first stage calculates the long-run relationship
between the variables in equation 2 with a dynamic ordinary
least squares (DOLS) regression. The second stage measures
the short-run behavior of relative export prices using an
error-correction (EC) regression. The two regressions are con-
nected since the difference between actual values and fitted
values in the DOLS regression is used in the EC regression to
predict relative export price movements. 
The DOLS approach, as used by Stock and Watson
(1993), modifies basic ordinary least squares estimation tech-
niques by including both leads and lags of the first difference
of all explanatory variables. These additional regressors are
necessary because estimates in a single equation model can be
biased by endogeneity among the variables. (In our regres-
sions, four leads and lags were used, with the longest leads
and lags eliminated if they were statistically insignificant. If
the fourth lead or lag was significant, then additional leads or
lags were added. The coefficients on the first difference vari-
ables are of no economic interest and are therefore not listed in
Table 2.) 
Certain conditions must be satisfied when conduct-
ing a DOLS regression: 
• The level data of all variables must be nonstationary,
while the first differences of the variables must be
stationary. Essentially, a variable is stationary if its
unconditional expected value and standard error do not
change over time. The data used here satisfy this
requirement.
• The DOLS regression results must yield stationary
residuals. The test statistic is the augmented Dickey-
Fuller test, listed as ADF in Table 2. 
• The DOLS residual must be significantly correlated
with subsequent monthly changes in relative export
prices.
Short-run behavior is evaluated using an EC regres-
sion. In this regression, all the variables are converted into
first differences, which, since the variables are in logs, is sim-
ilar to converting the data into percentage changes. The
change in relative export prices is then regressed against the
lag of the residual from the DOLS regression,  , lags of
changes in the explanatory variables, and lags of changes in
relative export prices.a
    
The residual is included since it should help predict how
relative export prices will change in subsequent months.
That is, any divergence of the relative export price index
from its long-run value should tend to disappear. A negative
and statistically significant residual is evidence that the
DOLS coefficients do indeed represent a long-run relation-
ship between the variables. The estimates of  , listed as
error-correction coefficients in Table 2, are all negative and
statistically significant, ranging from –0.10 for precision
equipment to –0.19 for transportation equipment. 
The EC regression estimates will be used to illus-
trate how relative export prices respond in the short run to a
change in the yen’s value. 
ut
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BOX B: ESTIMATING LONG-RUN AND SHORT-RUN PRICING-TO-MARKET BEHAVIOR 
a The contemporaneous value of the real yen is included to capture the automatic change in relative export price from Japanese exporters invoicing
their goods in foreign currency terms.FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 47
short run to the yen, whether the response depends on the
direction of the yen’s movement, and whether markup
behavior changed during the Asian currency crisis.
THE SHORT-RUN RESPONSE OF PROFIT 
MARGINS TO CHANGES IN THE YEN
It is likely that the short-run response of relative profit
margins to changes in the yen differs from the long-run
responses in Table 2. For example, if firms list the prices of
their exports in dollar terms, one might see export prices,
in yen terms, overshoot their long-run value. Alternatively,
export prices might be slow to respond if firms contract
out their prices in yen terms. 
Chart 2 lists the response of relative export prices
to a 10 percent rise in the real yen. (See Box C for details on
how these values were calculated.) Essentially, the chart
plots the month-to-month change following a rise in the
yen. The reactions of profit margins for firms producing
electrical machinery and transportation equipment are
similar. For transportation equipment, there is an
immediate 7 percent drop in export prices relative to
prices charged to Japanese customers. Profit margins on
exports are consequently squeezed sharply in the first few
months, while foreign customers see relatively modest
increases in the price of Japanese goods. Firms in this
industry, though, do not view a drop in markups of this
magnitude as being in their best interest. They pull export
prices up shortly thereafter so that within twelve months
the decline in relative export prices is near the long-run
response of roughly 4.5 percent (represented by the horizontal
lines in the chart). The overshooting of yen export prices
suggests that a substantial portion of Japanese exports
in both the electrical machinery and transportation equipment
industries are invoiced in foreign currency terms, making
the initial reaction of export prices to the yen more a
passive response than a strategic choice by firms to reduce
profit margins. 
Exporters of industrial machinery and preci-
sion equipment are much less prone to overreact to a
yen appreciation, implying that they are less likely to set
contract prices in dollar terms. Firms producing industrial
machinery adjust their margins to their long-run levels
almost immediately, while those exporting precision
equipment shift their margins to near their desired long-run
levels within four months. 
SYMMETRY
When Japanese firms cut the yen price of their exports to
offset a yen appreciation, they are sacrificing profit margins
to protect sales. However, when the yen depreciates, do
these firms raise the yen price of their exports to the same
extent in order to build their margins, or do they view a
weak yen as an opportunity to gain market share by
forgoing profits? 
Since the beginning of the floating rate period,  there
have been only two episodes in which the yen experienced a
prolonged depreciation: November 1988 to April 1990
and May 1995 to April 1997. To address the issue of how
firms respond to a yen depreciation, we created an event
dummy variable with a value of 1 for these two episodes
and a value of 0 for all other months. This dummy variable
was then multiplied by the exchange rate series to create
an additional variable for the regression. The statistical
significance of the dummy exchange rate variable is a simple
test of whether the exchange rate coefficient depends on
the direction of the yen’s movements. The extent of any
change is measured by adding the two exchange rate
coefficients. 
In all four regressions, the responses of relative
export prices to the yen were found to be the same regardless
of the yen’s direction, with the size of the coefficients on
the dummy variables being too small to change the values
in Table 2. Japanese exporters of electrical machinery,
industrial machinery, transportation equipment, and precision
equipment respond in the same fashion regardless of the
yen’s direction. When the yen falls, the firms allow the foreign
currency price of their exports to fall. The drop in prices
seen by foreign customers is not as great as the yen’s slide
because Japanese firms strive to keep prices near other
competing market prices. As a consequence, a falling yen
helps profit margins to the same extent as a rising yen
hurts them. 48 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999
Short-Run Response of Relative Export Prices to a 10 Percent Yen Appreciation
Chart 2
Percentage change
Source:  Author’s calculations.













































THE ASIAN CURRENCY CRISIS
The recent currency crisis in Asia created considerable uncer-
tainty for Japanese exporters. The crisis started in early 1997
when the Thai government spent heavily to prop up its
financial sector. Efforts to defend the currency against specu-
lators failed, and the bhat was eventually allowed to float in
early July. Pressures on exchange rates and government
reserve holdings subsequently spread throughout the region,
leading Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand to
suffer major devaluations while Singapore and Taiwan
experienced significant but relatively modest declines.
The crisis complicated decision making for
Japanese firms. In particular, exporters faced increased
uncertainty over the level at which these currencies would
eventually settle and the extent of their Asian customers’
decline in demand for Japanese goods. In addition, Japanese
firms faced greater uncertainty about the pricing and avail-
ability of imported components and materials from their
Asian suppliers. 
Because the Asian crisis occurred at the end of our
sample period, it is possible to investigate the change in
markup behavior by looking at the out-of-sample performance
of the regressions estimated above. A successful forecasting
of relative export prices would provide evidence that the
markup behavior of Japanese firms was unaffected by the
turmoil in Asia. A poor forecasting performance wouldFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 49
suggest that markup behavior changed in the aftermath
of the crisis. Chart 3 plots the percentage difference
between the prices Japanese firms charged their foreign
and domestic customers, with the difference set to zero
in 1990. (A decline reflects the falling of export prices
relative to domestic Japanese prices.) For industrial
machinery, transportation equipment, and precision
equipment, the behavior of relative export prices appears to
have been unaffected by the Asian currency crisis. All three
industries raised their export prices relative to domestic
prices after June 1996. In doing so, they took advantage, in
a predictable way, of the yen’s weakness against the dollar
and European currencies to boost their profit margins on
exported goods relative to goods sold in Japan. 
For electrical machinery, however, relative
export prices quickly went off track, with the gap widening
considerably during the height of the crisis at the end of
1997. Specifically, Japanese firms in this industry raised
relative export prices—an action that boosted margins on
exported goods—while our regression predicted no such
increase. The gap remained essentially unchanged during
the first nine months of 1998. 
BOX C: SIMULATING SHORT-RUN DYNAMICS
The dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) regression results
in Table 2 represent estimates of the long-run relationship
between the export-weighted real yen index and the index of
export prices relative to the index for domestic wholesale
prices. The error-correction (EC) equation specified in Box B
estimates how month-to-month changes in relative export
prices are related to all variables considered and to the dif-
ference between the current level of relative export prices
and the value suggested by the coefficients in Table 2. A
combination of the DOLS and EC regressions can be used to
illustrate how a permanent change in the real yen works to
affect relative export prices over time. Specifically, the DOLS
regression defines u so that the EC regression can be used to
track monthly changes. (The coefficients from the EC regres-
sion appear in the table.)
A spreadsheet can show how relative export prices
would react to a permanent 10 percent increase in the real
export-weighted yen index. All other variables are assumed
to be unchanged in this exercise. In the first month, the yen
affects the change in relative export prices through the con-
temporaneous yen coefficient in the EC regression. In the
second month, the yen works through the lagged yen variable
(if it was statistically significant) and through the lagged
residual value from the DOLS regression. This value is non-
zero if the change in relative export prices in the first month
did not push it to its long-run value dictated by the DOLS
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R2 .81 .81 .84 .29
Sum of 
  squared errors  .003 .012 .012 .019
export prices in each month added to the change in the previ-
ous month to arrive at the results in Chart 2.
Source: Author’s calculations.
Notes: The sample period extends from January 1981 to June 1997. The
t-statistics are based on Newey-West adjusted standard errors. The regres-
sions were originally run as specified in Box C and then all statistically insig-
nificant variables were dropped. The EC variable is the time series of residuals 
from the regression results in Table 2. The number in parentheses next to a 
variable name represents the lag of the variable. 50 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999
Behavior of Relative Export Prices since the Beginning of the Asian Crisis
Percentage Gap between Export and Domestic Price Indexes
Chart 3
Index: 1990 = 0
Sources:  Bank of Japan; author’s calculations.
Notes:  Data are through September 1998. Fitted values are based on regressions in Table 2. Fitted values in shaded areas are out-of-sample forecasts starting in July 1997.






















































Fitted values Actual values
The source of our regression’s failure to predict
an increase can be found by again using dummies to
look for changes in coefficient estimates during the cri-
sis period. We ran our regression through September
1998 with four additional variables that were calculated
by multiplying each variable by a dummy. The dummy
is defined as equal to 0 before July 1997 and equal to 1
for the rest of the sample. The results show that the
uncertainty faced by exporters did not change the spe-
cific response of relative export prices to the yen.
Instead, the coefficients on the other three variables all
moved to explain why relative export prices increased
during the crisis period. Such instability suggests that
firms were uncertain about the demand characteristics
of their foreign and domestic customers. Nevertheless,
this uncertainty did not appear to have caused Japanese
firms to alter their willingness to absorb exchange rate
swings into their profit margins. 
CONCLUSION
Japanese firms adjust the yen prices of their exports when
the yen’s value changes, a strategy that makes profit mar-
gins an important channel through which exchange rates
affect Japan’s economy. We find that in three of the four
industries examined, the firms aggressively shield their
foreign customers from price swings by allowing the profitFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 51
margins on exports to fall 4 percent (relative to margins on
goods sold in Japan) for every 10 percent appreciation of
the yen.
 Our findings also reveal that in Japan’s electrical
machinery and transportation equipment industries, the
short-run responses of profit margins to changes in the yen
are significantly greater than the long-run responses. This
behavior is likely due to the fact that many exports in these
two industries are denominated in foreign currency terms,
making the change in export prices and profit margins an
automatic, proportional response to changes in the yen.
Moreover, the response of profit margins to changes in the
yen is not found to depend on the direction of the yen’s
movements. Firms are as aggressive at raising export prices
and building up profit margins after a favorable yen shift as
they are at reducing profit margins after the yen moves
against them.
Finally, the instability observed in pricing behavior
in the wake of the Asian currency crisis seems to be limited
to Japan’s electrical machinery industry. Our forecasts
predicted that firms in this industry should not have raised
profit margins on exports relative to domestic sales as
much as they did. Our findings suggest that firms in this
industry have not changed the way in which they adjust
profit margins in response to yen movements. Rather, the
recent instability in markup behavior stems from changes
in how exporters respond to other relevant variables. 52 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 APPENDIX
APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES
(multiplicative) command in the EViews 3 software
package. 
Foreign variables are indexes constructed using
data from the United States, Canada, Germany, the United
Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and Singapore. The weights are based on the share
of Japanese exports to each country, by each industry, in
1990. The data on industrial production, wholesale prices,
and exchange rates are gathered from the International
Monetary Fund, Data Resources International, Datastream,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and country
sources. 
Industrial production data from the four Asian
countries are seasonally adjusted using the X-11 (multipli-
cative) command in EViews 3. 
Japanese price data, at the wholesale level, are available
for Japanese exports and for goods made by Japanese
firms that are sold in the Japanese domestic market. The
price indexes, published by the Bank of Japan, are
Laspeyres, with weights altered every five years. These
price data are significantly better than unit value export
price indexes, which are simply the value of exports
divided by the number of items shipped with no adjust-
ments made for changes in the quality and composition
of exports over time. The Bank of Japan is also the
source of price indexes for inputs purchased by firms in
each industry. The real unit labor cost measure is calcu-
lated using indexes for wages and productivity for each
industry available in the Monthly Statistics of Japan.
These indexes are seasonally adjusted using the X-11ENDNOTES
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1.  Examples of pass-through studies on Japan include Athukorala and
Menon (1994), Loopesko and Johnson (1988), Marston (1990), and
Tange (1997). 
2. The pricing-to-market concept goes back at least as far as Krugman
(1987). Pricing-to-market studies on Japanese exporters include Marston
(1990), Ohno (1991), Khosla (1991), and Gagnon and Knetter (1995).  
3. The ratio of the two indexes cannot tell you how the profit margin
for exports compares with the margin for goods sold in Japan, since by
construction both indexes are equal in the base year.
4. The four industries made up approximately 75 percent of Japanese
exports in 1997. Industrial machinery and electrical machinery were
each 24 percent, transportation equipment was 22 percent, and
precision equipment was 5 percent.
5. Marston’s model also has markups influenced by the derivative of
marginal cost with respect to output. 
6. The special case is when foreign customers do not respond at all to
prices.
7. This result is similar to those found in other empirical studies. A
survey of the literature in this field done by Goldberg and Knetter
(1997) reported that measurements of pricing to market tend to be
around 50 percent. They cite, as an example, the results reported by
Marston (1990). 54 FRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / APRIL 1999 NOTES
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